沉思中汇聚存在-论海德格尔的Vernehmen

The gathering of being in meditative thinking-the concept of Vernehmen in Heidegger

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DOI 10.12208/j.ssr.20260044
刊名
Modern Social Science Research
年,卷(期) 2026, 6(2)
作者
作者单位

西南大学哲学系 重庆

摘要
知觉被视为主体通达外在对象的通道,在认识论形而上学中承担着提供经验确定性的任务。然而这样的理解预设了主体对象的二元框架,使知觉被限定为理论态度下的把握活动。胡塞尔虽借助现象学还原突破康德式的先验结构,但其对意向性与给予性的分析仍以意识的指向行为作为显现的基础,从而遮蔽了显现本身的发生方式。海德格尔从对理论态度的批评出发,追问知觉之前存在何以可能显现自身,并由此打开通往Vernehmen 的途径。
Abstract
Perception has traditionally been understood as the channel through which the subject gains access to external objects, and within epistemological metaphysics it is assigned the task of providing experiential certainty. Such an understanding, however, presupposes a subject–object dualistic framework, within which perception is confined to an act of grasping governed by a theoretical attitude. Although Husserl, through phenomenological reduction, breaks with the Kantian transcendental structure, his analyses of intentionality and givenness nevertheless take the intentional acts of consciousness as the ground of appearing, thereby obscuring the very mode of occurrence of appearance itself. Beginning with a critique of the theoretical attitude, Heidegger asks how beings can show themselves prior to perception, and in doing so opens a path toward “Vernehmen”.
关键词
沉思;知觉;存在;海德格尔
KeyWord
Contemplation; Perception; Being; Heidegger
基金项目
页码 14-21
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周业桢. 沉思中汇聚存在-论海德格尔的Vernehmen [J]. 现代社会科学研究. 2026; 6; (2). 14 - 21.

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