Modern Social Science Research

This article systematically explores the competitive harms of self-preferencing behaviors by digital platforms and their legal regulatory pathways. The study first defines the constitutive elements and typical models of self-preferencing behaviors, including search result manipulation, data exploitation, and coercive transaction terms, and illustrates these with case studies involving Google, Amazon, and Alibaba. In terms of impact assessment, the research compares and analyzes the differences between the EU's regulatory logic, which focuses on market structure and comprehensive harm assessment, and the U.S. approach, which emphasizes efficiency and consumer welfare tests. Finally, the article proposes specific recommendations for improving China's relevant legal regulations, including clarifying legal definitions, enhancing platform transparency, constructing a comprehensive regulatory system, and balancing innovation with fair competition. The aim is to provide theoretical reference for the healthy and orderly development of the digital market.

Digital platforms; Self-preferencing; Brand competition; Legal regulation; Antitrust