Modern Social Science Research

Digital platform self-preferencing refers to the business strategy whereby platforms prioritize the promotion of their own products or services while reducing the visibility of third-party competitors. As super-platforms such as Google and Amazon have frequently faced antitrust investigations worldwide, the harm caused by such behavior to brand fair competition has become a core issue in antitrust regulation in the digital economy era. Drawing on economic models and legal theory, this paper analyzes how self-preferencing distorts the brand competition ecosystem through three mechanisms: traffic deprivation, cost shifting, and innovation suppression. It further points out that the extent of harm is context-dependent, influenced by factors such as commission rates and market dependency. Regarding regulatory approaches, it is recommended that China establish a "case-by-case analysis framework under the rule of reason," assessing illegality based on the platform's market power, the degree of brand dependency, and the extent of competitive harm. Leveraging the revision of the Anti-Monopoly Law, obligations for "gatekeeper platforms" should be specified, and systems for data separation and algorithm transparency should be established to balance platform efficiency with brand fair competition.

Self-preferencing; Brand fair competition; Antitrust regulation