碳信用视角下企业自愿减排与碳交易行为的演化博弈研究-工程学研究-CSCIED科技核心评价数据库-手机版

碳信用视角下企业自愿减排与碳交易行为的演化博弈研究

Research on the evolutionary game of voluntary emission reduction and carbon trading behavior of enterprises from the perspective of carbon credit

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DOI	10.12208/j.jer.20250002
刊名	工程学研究 Journal of Engineering Research
年，卷(期)	2025, 4(1)
作者	崔嘉伟, 邓洁芳, 邝映珊, 李强, 田昌民, 谢家意, 张志鹏, 周睿菲,
作者单位	广州南洋理工职业学院智能工程学院广东广州
摘要	为了揭示碳信用视角下企业自愿减排与碳交易的行为规律，构建了政府-企业的演化博弈模型, 剖析了碳价格、碳信用激励因子、碳信用惩罚因子和排放优化强度对政府和企业在自愿减排与碳交易方面行为的影响机理。结果表明：碳价格过低，政府会选择不调整配额，以避免在短期内对市场产生过大的波动，以起到维护市场稳定的作用。碳交易价格上升，政府越会关注碳配额的优化分配。其次，碳信用激励和惩罚作用越大，企业的自愿减排意愿越强。排放优化强度越大，政府优化配额的难度增加，企业面临的减排任务也会变得艰巨。
Abstract	In order to reveal the behavioral patterns of voluntary emission reduction and carbon trading of enterprises from the perspective of carbon credit, a government enterprise evolutionary game model was constructed, and the impact mechanisms of carbon prices, carbon credit incentive factors, carbon credit punishment factors, and emission optimization intensity on the behavior of government and enterprises in voluntary emission reduction and carbon trading were analyzed. The results indicate that if the carbon price is too low, the government will choose not to adjust the quota to avoid excessive fluctuations in the market in the short term, in order to maintain market stability. As carbon trading prices rise, the government will pay more attention to optimizing the allocation of carbon quotas. Secondly, the greater the incentive and punitive effects of carbon credits, the stronger the voluntary willingness of enterprises to reduce emissions. The greater the intensity of emission optimization, the more difficult it is for the government to optimize quotas, and the emission reduction tasks faced by enterprises will also become daunting.
关键词	碳信用；自愿减排；碳交易；演化博弈
KeyWord	Carbon credit; Voluntary emission reduction; Carbon trading; Evolutionary game theory
基金项目
页码	8-17

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引用本文

崔嘉伟, 邓洁芳, 邝映珊, 李强, 田昌民, 谢家意, 张志鹏, 周睿菲. 碳信用视角下企业自愿减排与碳交易行为的演化博弈研究 [J]. 工程学研究. 2025; 4; (1). 8 - 17.

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