考虑电动汽车用户成本最优的聚合商主从博弈充放电策略研究-电气工程与自动化-CSCIED科技核心评价数据库-手机版

考虑电动汽车用户成本最优的聚合商主从博弈充放电策略研究

Aggregator master-slave game for scheduling strategy of charging and discharging with considering the optimal cost of electric vehicle users

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DOI	10.12208/j.jeea.20250105
刊名	电气工程与自动化 Journal of Electrical Engineering and Automation
年，卷(期)	2025, 4(4)
作者	葛辉^1,2, 刘程子¹, 孙浩冉¹, 王雯雯¹, 邢强¹, 杨艳¹,
作者单位	1 南京邮电大学自动化学院、人工智能学院江苏南京 2 南京邮电大学碳中和先进技术研究院江苏南京
摘要	电动汽车无序充电让新能源为主体的新型电力系统中的多元决策主体均处在高成本、低收益且不安全的运行状态，针对这一问题，本文提出了一种考虑多元决策主体成本最优的电动汽车有序充放电方法。首先，构建了电动汽车用户成本支付函数最优的多目标优化模型，考虑了电动汽车充放电电价的随机性，并引入了可以改变电价的随机变量，把电动汽车用户成本支付函数转化为成本期望和成本偏差，并利用二次综合合理度函数获得最优解策略。其次，构建了电动汽车聚合商放电竞价模型和配电网运营商调度计划策略模型，并应用到双方主从非合作博弈模型中，通过求解非合作博弈纳什均衡，得到多元主体经济性均最优的电动汽车充放电调度策略。最后，通过仿真算例，结果表明上述方法可有效降低用户成本，提高电动汽车聚合商、配电网运营商的经济收益，其中所提出的基于电动汽车聚合商放电竞价的主从非合作博弈方法在有着较好的削峰填谷的消纳功能的同时，也提高了配电网系统的安全性。
Abstract	The disorderly charging of electric vehicle (EV) makes the multiple decision-makers in the new power system dominated by new energy all in the state of high cost, low income and unsafe operation, for this problem, an orderly charging and discharging method considering the optimal cost of multiple decision-makers is proposed. First of all, a multi-objective optimization model for EV user (EVU) cost payment function is formulated with considering the randomness of EV charging and discharging electricity price. By introducing the random variable which can change the electricity price, the EVU cost payment function is transformed into cost expectation and cost deviation, and the optimal solution strategy can be obtained according to the secondary comprehensive reasonable function. Secondly, the discharge bidding model of EV aggregator (EVA) and the dispatching plan strategy model of distribution network operators are constructed, and applied to the non-cooperative game model of both sides. By solving the Nash equilibrium of non-cooperative game, the EV charging and discharging dispatching strategy with the optimal economy of multiple subjects is obtained. Finally, through the simulation examples, the results show that the above method can effectively reduce the EVU cost, improve economic benefits of the EVA and distribution network operators, and the above-mentioned master-slave non-cooperation game based on discharge bidding has a good absorption effect of peak cutting and valley filling function at the same time, also improve the security of the distribution network system.
关键词	电动汽车；充放电电价；主从非合作博弈；用户成本；多目标优化模型
KeyWord	Electric vehicle; Charge-discharge electricity price; Master-slave non-cooperation game; User cost; Multi-objective optimization model
基金项目
页码	1-12

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引用本文

葛辉^,, 刘程子, 孙浩冉, 王雯雯, 邢强, 杨艳. 考虑电动汽车用户成本最优的聚合商主从博弈充放电策略研究 [J]. 电气工程与自动化. 2025; 4; (4). 1 - 12.

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